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Abstract. - We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game on scale-free networks for dif-
ferent initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and
defectors: initially random distribution with different frequencies of defectors; intentional or-
ganization with defectors initially occupying the most connected nodes with different fractions
of defectors; intentional assignment for cooperators occupying the most connected nodes with
different proportions of defectors at the beginning. It is shown that initial configurations for co-
operators and defectors can influence the stationary level of cooperation and the evolution speed
of cooperation. Organizations with the vertices with highest connectivity representing individuals
cooperators could exhibit the most robust cooperation and drive evolutionary process to converge
fastest to the high steady cooperation in the three situations of initial distributions. Otherwise,
we determine the critical initial frequencies of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators
occurs for the respective initial distributions, and find that the presence of network loops and
clusters for cooperators can favor the emergence of cooperation.
Introduction. – Evolutionary game theory has be-
come an important tool for investigating cooperative be-
havior of biological, ecological, social and economic sys-
tems [1, 2]. The Prisoner’ Dilemma game (PDG) is one
of the most commonly employed games for this purpose.
Originally, in the PDG, two individuals adopt one of the
two available strategies, cooperate or defect; both receive
R under mutual cooperation and P under mutual defec-
tion, while a cooperator receives S when confronted to a
defector, which in turn receives T , where T > R > P > S
and T+S < 2R. Under these conditions it is best to defect
for rational individuals in a single round of the PDG, re-
gardless of the opponent strategy. However, mutual coop-
eration would be preferable for both of individuals. Thus,
the dilemma is caused by the selfishness of the individuals.
However, the unstable cooperative behavior is opposite
to the observations in the real world. This disagreement
thus motivates to find under what conditions the coopera-
tion can emerge on the PDG. Graph theory provides a nat-
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ural and very convenient framework to study the evolution
of cooperation in structured populations. In well-mixed
populations, each individual interacts with each other in-
dividual. The average payoff of defectors is greater than
the average payoff of cooperators and the frequency of
cooperators asymptotically vanishes. In other structured
populations, each individual occupies one vertex and indi-
viduals only interact with their neighbors in a social net-
work. Several studies have reported the cooperation level
on different types of networks [3–7]. Nowak and May in-
troduced a spatial evolutionary PDG model in which in-
dividuals located on a lattice play with their neighbors,
and found that the spatial effect promotes substantially
the emergence of cooperation [3]. Santos et al. have stud-
ied the PDG and Snowdrift game (SG) on scale-free net-
works and found that comparing with the regular net-
works, scale-free networks provide a unifying framework
for the emergence of cooperation [6]. Notably, scale-free
networks where the degree distribution follows a power law
form are highly heterogeneous, and the heterogeneity of
the network structure can promote cooperation. However,
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the puzzle of cooperation on social networks is unanswered
yet. Recently, the roots of the diverse behavior observed
on scale-free networks are explored [8,9]. Cooperators can
prevail by forming network clusters, where they help each
other on heterogeneous networks [10]. In scale-free net-
works, the majority of nodes have only a few links, while
a small number of nodes with high connectivity (hubs) are
well connected to each other. This extremely inhomoge-
neous connectivity distribution results in the robustness of
scale-free networks [11]. As a result, the presence of hubs
and relative abundance of small loops for cooperators in
scale-free networks can promote the level of cooperation.
From these results on scale-free networks, it seems that
cooperation can be affected by the initial distribution for
cooperators (C) and defectors (D), such as randomly or
intentionally distributions, individuals initially assigned
with equal or unequal probability to be C or D. Similarly,
a special initial distribution for C and D may exhibit a ro-
bust cooperation on scale-free networks. However, in most
literature, initial strategies of individuals are randomly as-
signed with the same probability to be C or D. Here, we
remove the setting and are interested in investigating the
evolution of cooperation for different initial distributions
on scale-free networks. The paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we describe the evolutionary game
model as well as networks in detail. And then simula-
tion results and analysis are provided in the third section.
Finally, conclusions are given in the fourth section.
The model. – Firstly, we construct scale-free net-
works using the Baraba´si and Albert model (BA) which
is considered to be the typical model of the heterogeneous
networks [12]. Starting from m0 vertices which are con-
nected to each other, at each time step one adds a new
vertex with m (m ≤ m0) edges that link the new vertex to
m different vertices already present in the system. When
choosing the vertices to which the new vertex connects,
one assumes that the probability Pi that a new vertex will
be connected to vertex i depends on the degree ki of ver-
tex i: Pi = ki/
∑
j kj . After t time steps this algorithm
produces a grape with N = t+m0 vertices and mt edges.
Here, we set m = m0 = 2 and network size N = 3000
for all the simulations. Thus, the average degree of this
network model can be given k¯ = 2m = 4.
After constructing networks, each site of the network is
occupied by an individual. Each individual who is a pure
strategist can only follow two simple strategies: cooper-
ate and defect. In one generation, each individual plays a
PDG with its neighbors simultaneously, and collects pay-
offs dependent on the payoff matrix parameters. The total
payoff of a certain individual is the sum over all interac-
tions in one generation. Following common practice [3,13],
we use a simplified version of PDG, make T = b, R = 1 and
P = S = 0, where b represents the advantage of defectors
over cooperators, being typically constrained to the inter-
val 1 < b < 2. Let us represent the individuals’ strategies
with two-component vector, taking the value s = (1, 0)T
for C-strategist and s = (0, 1)T for D-strategist. There-
fore, the total payoff Px of a certain individual x can be
written as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTxAsy, (1)
where the sum runs over all the neighboring sites of x, and
Ωx is the set of neighbors of element x.
During the evolutionary process, each individual is al-
lowed to learn from one of its neighbors and update its
strategy in each generation. Following previous works
[13, 14], each individual chooses one individual randomly
from its neighbors. After choosing a neighbor y, the indi-
vidual x adopts the selected y neighbor’s strategy in the
next generation with a probability depending on their to-
tal payoff difference as
Wsx←sy =
1
1 + exp [(Px − Py)/K]
, (2)
where K characterizes the noise effects, including fluctu-
ations in payoffs, errors in decision, individual trials, etc.
And Px, Py denote the total payoffs of individuals x and y,
respectively. Here, K is set to 0.125 for the total payoffs.
Furthermore, the results remain unaffected with different
values of the parameter K.
Simulations and discussion. – In the following, we
will show the simulation results carried out for a popula-
tion of N = 3000 individuals occupying the vertices of the
scale-free networks with k¯ = 4. The above model is simu-
lated with synchronous updating. Eventually, the system
reaches a dynamic equilibrium state. The equilibrium fre-
quencies of C are obtained by averaging over the last 1000
generations after a transient time of 10000 generations. In
what follows, three situations of initial distributions for C
and D will be considered: (1) defectors are randomly dis-
tributed to occupy the network vertices; (2) defectors on
purpose occupy the highly connected nodes; (3) defectors
are intentionally assigned to occupy the nodes with small
connectivity. In these respective situations, the effects of
different initial frequencies of defectors fID on the emer-
gence of cooperation are subsequently investigated, too.
In situations (2) [situation (3)], nodes in the scale-free
networks are sorted by decreasing (increasing) number of
links that each node contains. There are instances where
groups of nodes contain identical numbers of links. Where
this occurs, they are arbitrarily assigned a position within
that groups. For example, the node rank r denotes the
position of a node on this ordered list and 1 ≤ r ≤ N [15].
Initially, when r defectors occupy the highly connected
nodes, they just occupy the r nodes with highest connec-
tivity in the networks ; while r defectors occupy the nodes
with small connectivity, they just occupy the r nodes with
smallest connectivity in the networks, and thus fID = r/N
is the initial frequency of D. The evolution of the frequency
of C as a function of b and fID for different initial distri-
butions has been computed. To this end, each data point
p-2
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Fig. 1: (Color Online) Evolution of cooperation in scale-free network with k¯ = 4. Results for the fraction of C at equilibrium
in the population are plotted as a contour, drawn as a function of two parameters: b and fID. (a) random distributions with
different initial frequencies of D; (b) different initial fractions of D which occupy nodes with high connectivity; (c) different
initial percentages of D which occupy nodes with small connectivity.
Fig. 2: (Color Online) Frequency of C at equilibrium as a function of the parameter b for different distributions with different
values of fID.
results from an average over 30 realizations of both the
networks and same initial distributions.
Fig. 1 shows the simulation results in the PDG for dif-
ferent initial distributions as a contour plot. Clearly, in
fig. 1(a) we have found that the cooperation level becomes
poorer when the initial frequency of D increases for a given
fixed b. Especially, the cooperation level begins to fluctu-
ate and decreases intensively when initial frequency of D
is large and near one for high values of b. While cooper-
ators dominate over the most ranges of b and ρID in this
situation. In fig. 1(b), cooperation strongly depends on
the values of fID, and defectors dominate over the most
ranges of b and fID. In fig. 1(c), a certain amount of co-
operation can emerge and remain stable even for high ini-
tial frequency of D, and cooperators prevail over the most
ranges of b and fID. A comparison of the different results
for different initial frequencies of D is shown in fig. 2. We
depict the cooperation level as a function of the param-
eter b. In fig. 2(a), we have found that the equilibrium
frequency of C begins to fluctuate and decrease for high
values of b when the initial frequency of D is high. And
the cooperation level remains stable for small values of b.
Additionally, when fID increases and approaches one, co-
operation fluctuates intensively and cooperators dies out
finally. As shown in fig. 2(b), cooperation is strongly in-
hibited as b increases when defectors are not wiped out.
There are larger oscillations and cooperation is sensitive
to initial frequency of D when defectors occupy the nodes
with highest connectivity at the beginning. Moreover, co-
operators vanish when the initial frequency of D is more
than 50% no matter what the value of b is. Fig. 2(c)
exhibits a robust and favorable cooperation for different
initial frequencies of D. Even if a small number of cooper-
ators initially occupy the rich nodes, it still leads to a high
cooperation level. The frequency of C decreases slowly for
a high initial frequency of D over the whole region of b.
The cooperative behavior is robust against defector’s inva-
sion in this situation. From fig. 2, we know that different
initial frequencies of D and distributions can result in dif-
ferent levels of cooperation. In addition, in comparison
with the two other situations, the situation that cooper-
ators occupy the rich nodes, presents much more robust
cooperation in this respect that high cooperation remains
for almost any temptation. It is shown that the time evo-
lution of cooperation in PDG for different values of b and
initial distributions with the same fID in fig. 3. It is found
that situation (3) that cooperators occupy the most con-
nected nodes at the beginning makes evolutionary process
converge much fastest to the equilibrium state of 100% co-
operators in the three situations, while situation (2) that
defectors firstly occupy the nodes with highest connectiv-
ity provides much harsher condition for the emergence of
cooperation than the two other situations and makes co-
operation level drop much fast. Situation (3) promotes the
p-3
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Fig. 3: (Color Online) Frequency of C at equilibrium as a func-
tion of evolution generations for different values of b and initial
distributions with the same fID. (a) b = 1.4 and 60% cooper-
ators at the beginning; (b) b = 1.1 and 90% cooperators at the
beginning.
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Fig. 4: Critical frequency of D for cooperators to vanish in the
PDG as a function of the parameter b for different situations.
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Fig. 5: The total actual number of links among r nodes against
r/N with N = 3000 and m = m0 = 2 in scale-free networks,
where r represents the node rank. (a) r nodes with the highest
connectivity in the networks; (b) r nodes with the smallest
connectivity in the networks. Each data point of the curves
results from 10 different network realizations.
emergence of cooperation and can speed up the evolution
of cooperation. Fig. 4 shows the critical frequency of D
for cooperators to vanish in the PDG as a function of b for
the three types of initial distributions and also illuminates
these results. When the initial frequency of D is higher
than the critical frequency of D, cooperators vanishes or
decreases intensively to extinction. For an arbitrary value
of b, the critical frequency of D in situation (3) is always
higher than those in situation (1) and (2). Initial ratios
of C in one certain distribution for C and D can affect
the cooperation level; otherwise, initial distributions for
C and D also influence the emergence of cooperation and
the evolution speed of cooperation.
These simulation results can be understood in the fol-
lowing way. In scale-free networks, there are a large num-
ber of nodes which have only a few links, and there are
small number of links among these less connected nodes;
while there are a small number of nodes with large num-
bers of links, these most connected nodes or hubs are
generally very well connected to each other (see fig. 5).
The connectivity between these hubs in the networks can
be crucial for the emergence of cooperation for the PDG
[9–11, 14, 16]. Based on these results, some correspond-
ing explanations on our results can be provided. At first,
we discuss the random initial distribution with different
fractions of D. When the initial percentage of D is small,
nodes with high connectivity will be occupied by defectors
with much smaller probability. In this case, individuals us-
ing strategy C representing highly connected nodes com-
municate with each other and form loop and main clus-
ter structures, and hence the high levels of cooperation
can emerge. Therefore, the probability, with which most
connected vertices are occupied by cooperators, decreases
when the initial fraction of D increases. Then clusters of
cooperators may be cut off (fragmented) from the main
compact cluster, but there are still some loops and frag-
p-4
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ments for cooperators. In this state there is a systematic
drop of cooperation at the beginning, nevertheless it tends
to rise again in the long run, thereby, cooperation falls but
can remain at a high level. While the initial percentage
of D is more than the critical frequency, it is still possi-
ble for a small number of C players to occupy the nodes
with high connectivity although the probability is so small,
since strategies C and D are randomly distributed among
all the players. Thus, there are large oscillations when
the initial frequency of D approaches one, because it is
increasingly difficult for the cooperators occupying most
connected nodes to communicate with each other in this
state. And then we investigate the situation that defectors
occupy the nodes with highest connectivity at the begin-
ning. In other words, cooperators initially occupy vertices
having only a few links. In fig. 5(b), it shows that there
are few actual links among about half of the nodes which
are almost the least connected nodes. When the initial
frequency of D is more than 50% in situation (2), it is not
possible to form network clusters for cooperators where co-
operators can help each other, and defectors are grouped
in several clusters, then cooperators lose more and more
elements from their outer layer along with the increment
of evolution generations, therefore, cooperators can not
survive no matter what the value of b is. Nevertheless,
only small isolated pieces can be formed for cooperators
when the fraction of D is less than the critical frequency,
since defectors occupy the most connected nodes. Thus,
it results in that cooperation falls intensively and can not
remain stable. However, a high level of cooperation is sus-
tainable just for small values of b, because in this case
defectors have not much advantage over cooperators. For
b ∼ 1, cooperators are equivalent to defectors, then the
level of cooperation is not strongly susceptible to the ini-
tial distribution for C and D. In fact, in all generations
cooperation falls rapidly at the beginning, then coopera-
tors sometimes recover but not always for small values of b
in situation (2). For large b, cooperation always falls and
never recovers. Therefore, in this state cooperation drops
rapidly and it needs much time to revert cooperation if
cooperation can recover finally. Accordingly, cooperators
vanish at the stationary state over the most regions of
b and fID. The situation, that individuals C intention-
ally assigned to represent the vertices with high connec-
tivity at the beginning, is analyzed finally. In this case,
it is easy for cooperators to form giant compact network
clusters and loops. Even if a small number of coopera-
tors occupy the most connected nodes, there are a large
number of loops and some tiny compact clusters for co-
operators; conversely, defectors are not organized in these
clusters, where cooperators can help each other and de-
fectors can not invade. The presence of clusters and loops
in the connectivity structure for cooperators sustains the
high level of cooperation even for a high value of b, and
in all generations they can favor cooperation at the begin-
ning, and drive evolutionary process to converge fast to
the high stationary cooperation level. Therefore, coopera-
tors dominate over the entire ranges of b and fID, and the
cooperative behavior is robust against defectors’ invasion
in this situation.
Scale-free networks have most of their connectivity clus-
tered and looped in a few nodes, therefore, initial assign-
ments for C and D can affect the cooperative behavior
and the evolution speed of cooperation. The configura-
tion that cooperators initially occupy the most connected
nodes, presents the much more robust cooperation than
the two other ones and can speed up the evolution of co-
operation, in comparison with the two other different ini-
tial configurations. Moreover, cooperators can prevail by
forming network clusters and loops, where they can assist
each other. These results are independent of the size of
the populations N .
Conclusions. – In summary, we have studied the co-
operative behavior of the evolutionary PDG on scale-free
networks for different initial distributions, and also found
that the presence of network loops and clusters for co-
operators can favor cooperation. Cooperators dominate
over the most range of b with different initial frequencies
of D when strategies C and D are randomly distributed
among the populations; a poor and unstable cooperation
level can be established at equilibrium in the state that
the vertices with high connectivity represent defectors at
the beginning; while a very robust and favorable coop-
eration can be exhibited in the situation that the highly
connected nodes are occupied by cooperators at the be-
ginning. The situation that cooperators initially occupy
the most connected nodes provides the most robust coop-
eration in the three situations of initial distributions for C
and D. Additionally, it is found that the configuration that
cooperators occupy the most connected nodes at the be-
ginning can speed up the evolution of cooperation; while
the situation that defectors occupy the most connected
nodes drives cooperation to drop fast and difficultly re-
cover. And the critical frequencies of D for cooperators to
vanish corresponding to initial distributions have been re-
spectively determined. Some qualified explanations based
on the property of scale-free networks are given for these
phenomenon. Therefore, our results shows that initial con-
figurations for C and D with different ratios of D at the
beginning can affect the levels of cooperation on hetero-
geneous networks. Moreover, our work may be helpful in
exploring the roots of the emergence of cooperation on
heterogeneous networks.
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